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‘What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate,
and would not stay for an answer.
– Francis Bacon (1561-1626), ‘On Truth’.
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The noble scorn of a Roman,
before whom the word ‘truth’
was shamelessly mishandled,
enriched the New Testament
with the only saying in it that
has any value . . . “What is
truth?”
– Nietzsche, ‘The Antichrist’ (1895).
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‘What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate,
and would not stay for an answer.
Pilate was in advance of his time. For
‘truth’ itself is an abstract noun, a
camel . . . of a logical construction,
which cannot get past the eye even
of a grammarian. . . . Philosophers
should take something more nearly
their own size to strain at. What needs
discussing rather is the use . . . of the
word ‘true.’
– J. L. Austin, ‘Truth’ (1950).
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“Suppose truth is, as it were, too small to sustain the
battle. This is the beginning . . . of the first truce in the
Truth Wars, . . . the first intimation that whichever side
we were on, we may have been fighting phantoms.”
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Introducing the Truth Wars . . .
Two issues about truth:
1 What kinds of things can be true?
2 What does it take for one of these things to be true?
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First question: What kinds of things can be true?
Beliefs, assertions, claims, statements, propositions . . .
Example: “The belief that we’re in Sydney is true”“The
assertion that we’re in Sydney is true”“The claim that
we’re in Sydney is true”“The proposition that we’re in
Sydney is true”
Second question: What does it take to be true?
This is where the controversy starts . . .
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Truth as “correspondence”
A natural idea: truth is some sort of “correspondence”, or
“matching” between thoughts (or words) and the world.
Beliefs,
assertions,
etc.
⇐⇒
“matching”
The World
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Problems with correspondence
1 What is this “correspondence”? We have some idea how
pictures can “match” the world, but words and thoughts?
2 Lots of different kinds of things can be true (e.g., in
science, maths, law, art, ethics, . . . ). Is it the same kind of
matching for all of them?
3 How could we know about it? (We check our beliefs against
other beliefs, not against the world.) So doesn’t it make
truth inaccessible, at least to mortals like us?
4 Why should we care about it?
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Truth-as-correspondence:
. . . the Enlightenment’s
version of the religious
urge to bow down before
a non-human power.
. . . just another of the
obsequious Names of
God.
– Richard Rorty.
Stanford Report, April  13, 2005
Philosopher Richard Rorty asserts notion of
mind/body distinction is false
BY BARBARA PALMER
L.A. Cicero
Richard Rorty, a philosopher and professor of comparative literature, said that the
use of visual perception as a metaphor for knowledge led to a picture of an inner
space, a "Cartesian theater," inhabited by things called ideas, impressions and
mental representations, which led to "bad" questions, such as, "What is the
relationship between what's out there and what's in here such that we can know
what's really out there?"
At an April 7 forum hosted by the Symbolic Systems Program, philosopher
Richard Rorty, who teaches in the Department of Comparative Literature,
posed the question, "Is there a problem about the relation between the mind
and the brain?"
His short answer—delivered in the course of a talk that traced the branching
paths of modern analytic philosophy, critiqued the usefulness of comparing
human neurons to silicon chips and pronounced metaphysics and
epistemology to be "bad developments"—is no.
"How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the
body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?" Rorty asked the
approximately 75 students and faculty assembled in a Sloan Hall lecture
room. In part, because both Plato and Aristotle used visual perception as a
model for talking about knowledge as something outside that is realized
inside, he said.
Because you can look at something, close your eyes and have a memory
image of it, it makes sense to say, "It used to be out there, but now it is in
here, too," when talking about visual perception, Rorty said. But, he
continued, the use of visual perception as a metaphor for knowledge led to
a picture of an inner space—a "Cartesian theater"—inhabited by things
called ideas, impressions and mental representations. This led to "bad"
questions such as, "What is the relationship between what's out there and
what's in here such that we can know what's really out there?" he said.
If we hadn't tried to use visual perception as a model for knowledge, we
wouldn't have been saddled with the problem of inside versus outside, Rorty
said. "This would have been all to the good because we wouldn't have had
most of the problems of modern philosophy—or half the problems of ancient
philosophy."
As he talked, Rorty gently paced at the front of the room and spoke with the
precision and clarity that have earned him praise as an "ultra-lucid"
philosopher.
Both metaphysics and epistemology could have been avoided had we
thought of knowledge as a social skill, he said. "The only question about the
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Truth as “coherence”
What we do seem to care about is how our claims and beliefs
“cohere” with one another – if we argue for the truth of a claim,
we support it with other claims.
This suggests the idea that beliefs and claims are true if they
cohere in the right way with other beliefs.
Advantage: Accessibility – coherence is an “internal” virtue.
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Problems with coherence
It seems too internal, too subjective.
Couldn’t our system of beliefs be thoroughly coherent,
thoroughly self-consistent, but still completely wrong?
Wittgenstein: “If what seems right is right, that just means
we can’t talk about ‘right’”
The dark side of relativism – “anything goes”. (“When
anything goes, nothing stays.”)
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Truth as what works
The true is the name of whatever
proves itself to be good in the way
of belief.
‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is
only the expedient in the way of
our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is
only the expedient in the way of
our behaving. Expedient in almost
any fashion . . .
– William James, ‘Pragmatism’ (1907).
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Problems with pragmatism
False beliefs can be useful. (Blackburn’s example: it may
be useful to believe that you are the most popular person
in the class, but that doesn’t make it true.)
Lots of truths are useless – of no
pragmatic value whatsoever – e.g.,
probably, the truth about the cause of
death of the very last dinosaur.
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Taking sides in the Truth Wars
Team Absolutist
Star players: Socrates,
Plato, Augustine, Aquinas,
Descartes, Russell, Moore,
Thomas Nagel, . . .
Credo: Truth is an objective
standard for human thought.
Team Relativist
Star players: Protagoras,
Hobbes, Nietzsche, William
James, Foucault, Derrida,
Rorty, . . .
Credo: Truth is a subjective
achievement, on a human
scale.
Huw Price Truth
Pilate’s ploy
Taking sides in the Truth Wars
The attractions of walking away
Losing our grip on the conversation
More Bacon
Frege’s transparent truth
Ramsey’s redundancy theory
Blackburn’s ‘minimalism’
Huw Price Truth
Pilate’s ploy
Taking sides in the Truth Wars
The attractions of walking away
Losing our grip on the conversation
More Bacon
Frege’s transparent truth
Ramsey’s redundancy theory
Blackburn’s ‘minimalism’
It is worth noticing that the sentence
“I smell the scent of violets” has just
the same content as the sentence “It is
true that I smell the scent of violets”.
So it seems . . . that nothing is added
to the thought by my ascribing to it a
property of truth. . . . May we not be
dealing here with something which
cannot be called a property in the
ordinary sense at all?
– Gottlob Frege (1918).
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Blackburn’s gloss of Frege’s idea:
It is as though you could always look
through “it is true that” to identify the
content judged, inquired after, and so
on, as if the reference to truth
was not there.
(i.e., truth is “transparent”).
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There is really no separate problem
of truth but merely a linguistic
muddle.
It is evident that “It is true that
Caesar was murdered” means no
more than that Caesar was
murdered, and “It is false that
Caesar was murdered” means that
Caesar was not murdered.
– F. P. Ramsey (1927).
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Both the relativist and the absolutist are impressed by
Pilate’s notorious question ‘What is Truth?’, and each
tries to say something useful at the same high . . . level
of abstraction. The minimalist can be thought of as
turning his back on this abstraction.
If the issue is whether high tide is at midday, then
truth consists in high tide being at midday. If the issue
is whether Blair is a fantasist, the truth lies in Blair
being a fantasist or not. . . . The point is to discourage
us from looking for anything more general.
– Simon Blackburn.
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Blackburn’s recipe for peace
Accept that “It is true that P” means
nothing more than “P”.
Give up looking for a general theory of
truth – a general answer to Pilate’s
question, “What is truth?”
Walk away.
Next: Why this is a recipe for disaster . . .
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Two kinds of examination
1 The exam as testimony.
Aim: Don’t say that P unless you believe that P.
2 The exam as test of knowledge.
Aim: Don’t say that P unless P.
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Example
Suppose I believe that Aristotle was a Belgian. Consider how I
fare on the following examinations:
1 The exam as testimony.
Q1 Was Aristotle a Belgian? YES 4
2 The exam as test of knowledge.
Q1 Was Aristotle a Belgian? YES 7
A crucial difference: The second kind of exam presupposes
an objective way of being right or wrong.
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Two kinds of conversation
1 Conversation as testimony.
Aim: Just say what you believe.
2 Conversation as a test of knowledge.
Aim: Don’t say that Aristotle was a Belgian unless
Aristotle actually was a Belgian.
Which kind do we have? The second kind!!
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Conversation-as-testimony in action:
Me: “Aristotle was a Belgian.”
You: “That’s interesting! Aristotle wasn’t a Belgian,
and neither was Plato.”
Notice that our disagreements “slide past one another” – if we
both think that the other is sincere, then we both think that
the other is right, by the only standards available.
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Making conversation “tacky”
Question: What do we need to make disagreements “grip”?
Answer: We need another kind of conversational “norm”, as
well as sincerity. We need the assumption that our claims have
to meet an objective standard of right and wrong.
Me: “Aristotle was a Belgian.”
You: “That’s not right! He was a Greek, like
Plato.”“That’s not true! He was a Greek, like
Plato.”
And this kind of “rightness” is just truth . . . but not
Blackburn’s “transparent” kind of truth!
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Truth as convenient friction
Does this mean we have to go back to the old question, the old
choices – correspondence, coherence or pragmatism?
Not necessarily!
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A new way to think about truth?
Think of conversation as a game invented by our ancestors.
The crucial rule: when we disagree with someone, we
can challenge, by saying “That’s wrong!” (even if we
think they are sincere).
We score points when someone agrees with us – when they
say “That’s right!” – and that gives us an incentive to
offer reasons for our beliefs.
My suggestion: We explain the most puzzling things about
truth by seeing that this is the kind of game we actually play.
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Cease-fire in the Truth Wars?
This solution offers something to both sides:
The game requires that we treat truth as objective – no one
wins just by believing that they’ve won. (In this sense, the
absolutists are right.)
But we don’t need to be gods to play it – we always base
our challenges on our own beliefs. (In this sense, the
relativists are right.)
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It is a pleasure, to stand upon the
shore, and to see ships tossed upon
the sea; a pleasure, to stand in the
window of a castle, and to see a
battle, and the adventures thereof
below: but no pleasure is comparable
to the standing upon the vantage
ground of truth . . . and to see the
errors, . . . in the vale below.
Huw Price Truth
Pilate’s ploy
Taking sides in the Truth Wars
The attractions of walking away
Losing our grip on the conversation
More Bacon
The game of the gods
The daughter of time
In modern translation:
Harbour views are great; so is
watching the football: but nothing
beats knowing that you’re right and
the other guy is wrong!
Huw Price Truth
Pilate’s ploy
Taking sides in the Truth Wars
The attractions of walking away
Losing our grip on the conversation
More Bacon
The game of the gods
The daughter of time
Conclusions
The pleasure Bacon is describing is a pleasure we humans
have invented for ourselves . . . a pleasure available to us
because we play a particular kind of conversational game.
This explains both why it seems a transcendent pleasure, a
god-like achievement; and why we don’t actually have to be
gods to enjoy it.
(And it is a much more useful myth than the gods
themselves!)
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Men have been kept back as by a kind of enchantment
from progress in the sciences, by reverence for . . . the
authority of men accounted great in philosophy.
It shows a feeble mind to grant so much to authors,
and yet deny Time his rights, who is the author of
authors, nay, rather of all authority.
Rightly is Truth called the Daughter of Time.
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